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Bootlegging, Oysters, and
Closed-to-Harvest Waters: Adding
Teeth to the Coastal Zone
Management Act to More Effectively
and Efficiently Restore the Coastal
Zone
Clare M. Harmon*

INTRODUCTION

As the impacts of climate change and the need to efficiently
preserve and cultivate the resources of the coastal zone become
more apparent, it becomes increasingly critical that the traditional
uses of the coastal zone are better balanced with its current needs
and capabilities.1 A degraded coastal zone affects a variety of
* J.D., Roger Williams University School of Law, Dec. 2016; B.A., Marine
Biology and Sustainability, Roger Williams University, 2013. For my parents,
Mary Ann and Justin Harmon, for each and every time you allowed me to break
into your bank so I could save a whale, single-handedly stop mass climate
change, or otherwise follow my blind ambition to keep the ocean alive. And for
John J. Roy of The Sound School Regional Aquaculture Center, in New Haven,
CT, for forcing me to apply to college when I was not ready and trusting me
with the lives of thousands of black sea bass. My personal growth that year
came at the expense of hundreds of fish that died. I am not very sorry about
the fish, but I am thankful for the options you ensured I had—when you knew
I would be ready for them come graduation.
1.
See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1453(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327)
(defining the coastal zone to include the coastal waters of every state with a
shoreline and the land inland from the shorelines to the extent necessary to
control shore lands); see also BILIANA CICIN-SAIN & ROBERT W. KNECHT, THE
FUTURE OF U.S. OCEAN POLICY: CHOICES FOR THE NEW CENTURY 263 (2000)
(discussing the interplay between the ocean and weather conditions and
predicted changes in connection with global warming).
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interests and requires a comprehensive solution.2 However, those
attempting to conserve and restore the public resources of the
coastal zone are being bogged down by the chaotic amalgamation of
laws necessary for permitting and licensure. Their efforts are
largely outpaced by the human demands of the coastal zone’s
resources.3 This Comment will point to some of the inefficiencies of
the current coastal restoration framework and focus on the
intersection between coastal health and the oyster fishery; it will
explore ways in which the coastal restoration framework may be
improved so that those attempting to restore the coastal zone for
the benefit of the public are not overly burdened.
The inefficiencies of the U.S. coastal and fisheries management
approach are well illustrated in the century-long decline of the
oyster fishery and the associated degradation of the oyster’s coastal
habitat.4 A century of treating oysters as an exploitable fishery
resource and giving their management to diverse fishery agencies
resulted in fragmented decisions about harvest controls,
restoration, and introduction of alternative, non-commercial
substitutes, which contributed to the national coastal conservation
crisis.5 In response to the failed preservation of the oyster,
scientists sought a single approach that addressed the concurrent
goal of restoring shellfish populations and the living and non-living
resources they affect. The 2005 Scientific Consensus Statement set
forth a working definition of an Ecosystem-Based Management
Approach (EBM):
2.
See KAREN L. MCLEOD, ET AL., SCIENTIFIC CONSENSUS STATEMENT ON
MARINE ECOSYSTEM-BASED MANAGEMENT 1 (2005), http://www.marine
planning.org/pdf/Consensusstatement.pdf [hereinafter SCIENTIFIC CONSENSUS
STATEMENT] (“Over half of the U.S. population lives along the coast, and more
than $200 billion in economic activity was associated with the ocean in 2000.”).
Of that $200 billion, the commercial fishing industry contributed over $28
billion and the revenue. U.S. COMM. ON OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT
FOR
THE
21ST
CENTURY
31
(2004),
http://www.aquariumof
pacific.org/images/mcri_uploads/ocean_full_report.pdf [hereinafter OCEAN
BLUEPRINT].
3.
OCEAN BLUEPRINT, supra note 2, at 32 (“Americans consume more
than 4 billion pounds of seafood at home or in restaurants and cafeterias every
year.”).
4. See B.J. Rothschild et al., Decline of the Chesapeake Bay Oyster
Population: A Century of Habitat Destruction and Overfishing, 111 MAR. ECOL.
PROG. SER. 29 (1994).
5. OCEAN BLUEPRINT, supra note 2, at 40 (“Although U.S. fishery
management has been successful in some regions, failures elsewhere have
resulted in substantial social and economic costs.”).
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[A]n integrated approach to management that considers
the entire ecosystem, including humans. The goal of
[EBM] is to maintain an ecosystem in a healthy,
productive and resilient condition so that it can provide
the services that humans want and need. [EBM] differs
from current approaches that usually focus on single
species, sector, or activity or concern; it considers the
cumulative impacts of different sectors.6
EBM is the best management approach to address a degraded
coastal zone because it recognizes the interconnectedness of the
coastal zone’s components including linkages across systems and
disciplines. EBM should be incorporated into marine resource
management through the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA),
because the CZMA is the primary framework for coastal
restoration.7 EBM offers the necessary framework for individual
states to strike a balance among competing demands for the natural
resources of the coastal zone. Despite its recognition among the
scientific community and policy recognition in coastal management
programs, very little has been done to implement EBM in marine
resource programs. Coastal states could more effectively utilize the
CZMA federal regulatory program to more efficiently restore and
protect the coastal zone.
The CZMA provides coastal restoration proponents the
opportunity to cut through excessive and conflicting state
regulation around coastal conservation and aquaculture to focus
directly on a solution that could preserve and clean up the coastal
zone.8 A key challenge in implementing the CZMA for coastal
restoration purposes is the lack of a streamlined procedure for
proponents acting for the public benefit.9 While either a new legal
authority or an appropriate amendment to the CZMA would be
ideal and may eventually become necessary, the CZMA allows a
state to adopt EBM without the added hassle of creating new
authority.10 This Comment will examine ways in which a coastal
state could use the CZMA to more efficiently restore its coastal zone
in light of EBM, using Rhode Island as an example. Part I will
6. SCIENTIFIC CONSENSUS STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 1.
7. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1451–1462 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327).
8. See id. § 1452(2)(G), (I) (Westlaw).
9. See generally id. § 1455 (Westlaw).
10. Id. § 1454 (Westlaw) (allowing states to submit their own coastal
management plans to the Secretary for review and approval).
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assess the federal coastal regulatory regime and Rhode Island’s
program pursuant to it. Part II will discuss the development of
shellfish aquaculture for the purpose of increasing habitat. And
finally, Part III will address some regulatory inefficiencies and
discuss possible improvements.
I.

THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

A. The Federal Coastal Zone Management Act
“Today, people who work and live on the water . . . face a
patchwork of confusing and sometimes contradictory
federal and state authorities and regulations. No
mechanism exists for establishing a common vision or set
of objectives.”11
In 1972, Congress passed the CZMA after a finding that there
was a “national interest in the effective management, beneficial
use, protection, and development of the coastal zone.”12 The CZMA
is a cooperative federal regime that resembles a contract between
the federal government and coastal states.13 The National Oceanic
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), a scientific agency within the
Department of Commerce, holds the regulatory authority.
Congress passed the CZMA in order to “preserve, protect, develop,
and where possible, to restore or enhance, the resources of the
Nation’s coastal zone.”14 Congress also wanted to encourage states
to “exercise effectively their responsibilities in the coastal zone
through the development and implementation of management
programs to achieve wise use of the land and water resources of the
coastal zone.”15 Thus, unlike other federal acts, the CZMA
incentivizes participation, but does not punish the state for
inaction, and provides states great discretion to prioritize their local
interests.16
11. S. REP. NO. 106-301 at 3 (2000).
12. § 1451(a) (Westlaw).
13. See John A. Duff, The Coastal Zone Management Act: Reverse PreEmption or Contractual Federalism?, 6 OCEAN & COASTAL L.K. 109, 111–12
(2001) (analogizing the CZMA to contractual agreements).
14. § 1452(1) (Westlaw) (emphasis added).
15. Id. § 1452(2) (Westlaw) (emphasis added).
16. See Patrick J. Gibbons, Too Much of a Good Thing? Federal
Supremacy and the Devolution of Regulatory Power: The Case of the Coastal
Zone Management Act, 48 NAVAL L. REV. 84, 91 (2001).
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The CZMA encourages coastal states to formulate coastal
management plans (CMP) and to submit them to the Secretary of
Commerce (Secretary) for approval.17 In formulating its CMP, a
state must account for a list of program elements.18 This list
includes, inter alia, an identification of coastal zone boundaries, an
inventory and designation of areas of particular concern, a
description of the organizational structure charged with
implementing its CMP, and a complete list of the federal license
and permit activities that affect its coastal zone that the state
wants to review for consistency.19 In exchange for participation, a
coastal state receives federal funding and cooperation in
effectuating its CMP and retains veto power for land uses that are
inconsistent with its CMP.20
Once the Secretary approves a state’s CMP, federal agency
activities and private party projects affecting the coastal zone must
be consistent with that CMP.21 Federal agency activities must be
consistent to the maximum extent practicable with the state’s
CMP.22 The federal agency that is managing the activity makes
the consistency determination for the relevant state agency.23 The
state then approves or rejects the determination.24 For all other
activities, the state conducts the consistency determination
according to its CMP.25 Applications for federal permits must
ensure that the activity corresponds with the state’s CMP.26 If the
state objects to a permit, it will not be issued unless the Secretary
overrides the objection.27 If the state does object, the agency may
pursue judicial intervention to enjoin the activity or mediation with
the Secretary.28

17. § 1454 (Westlaw).
18. Id. § 1455(d)(1)–(2) (Westlaw).
19. Id.
20. To receive approval under the statute, a state’s CMP must manifest a
series of program elements that include: defining the coastal zone, establishing
permissible land and water uses, and describing the way in which the state
intends to enforce control. See id. § 1456 (Westlaw).
21. Id. § 1456(c) (Westlaw).
22. Id.
23. Id. § 1456(c)(1)(C) (Westlaw).
24. Id.; see also 15 C.F.R. § 930.1 (2014).
25. § 1456(c)(3)(A)–(d) (Westlaw).
26. Id. § 1456 (c)(2) (Westlaw).
27. Id. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (Westlaw).
28. 15 C.F.R. § 930.35(e) (2014).
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B. Rhode Island’s Coastal Zone Management Program
The Rhode Island General Assembly formulated the Rhode
Island Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC) in 1971—
a year prior to federal enactment of the CZMA—to effectuate its
duties in the coastal zone.29 The Federal Office of Coastal
Management approved Rhode Island’s first regulatory program
integrating federal approval criteria in 1977, qualifying the state
for $1.2 million annually in implementation funds.30
The Rhode Island Ocean Special Area Management Plan
(Ocean SAMP) serves as the state CMP for CZMA purposes.31 The
Ocean SAMP establishes state policies to serve as criteria for
granting or denying permits, but these are unenforceable.32 The
Rhode Island General Assembly requires the CRMC to “where
possible, restore the coastal resources of the state . . . through
comprehensive and coordinated long range planning and
management designed to produce the maximum benefit for society
from these coastal resources.”33 Rhode Island’s CRMC is required
to use the preservation and restoration of ecosystems as primary
guidance principles when considering alteration of coastal
resources.34 Rhode Island’s Ocean SAMP is a milestone recognized
by President Obama’s Ocean Policy Task Force as a national model
for marine spatial planning.35 The Ocean SAMP is expected to
“promot[e] a balanced and comprehensive [EBM] approach to
development and protection of Rhode Island’s ocean resources.”36
The Ocean SAMP cites, incorporates, encourages, and enforces the
Scientific Consensus on Marine Ecosystem-Based Management in
29. § 1456 (Westlaw); 46 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-23-6(1)(i) (West, Westlaw
through 2016 Legis. Sess.).
30. R.I. COASTAL RES. MGMT. COUNCIL, RHODE ISLAND COASTAL RESOURCES
MANAGEMENT COUNCIL: OVER 30 YEARS OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN COASTAL
MANAGEMENT
6
(2005),
http://www.library.state.ri.us/publications
/CRMC/CRMC_30YearsBW.pdf.
31.
R.I. COASTAL RES. MGMT. COUNCIL, UNIV. OF R.I., THE
OCEAN/OFFSHORE RENEWABLE ENERGY SPECIAL AREA MANAGEMENT PLAN 1
(2008).
32. Id.
33. 46 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-23-1(a)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Legis.
Sess.).
34. Id.
35. Letter from Michael M. Tikoian, Chairman, R.I. Coastal Resources
Management Council (Oct. 19, 2010), www.crmc.ri.gov/samp_ocean/final
approved/0_TikoianIntroLetter.pdf.
36. Id.
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its management of the coastal zone. The Ocean SAMP identifies
four goals to balance coastal development with the protection of its
marine resources:
1. Foster a properly functioning ecosystem that is both
ecologically and economically beneficial.
2. Promote and enhance existing uses.
3. Encourage marine-based economic development that
considers aspirations of local communities and is
consistent with and complimentary to the state’s overall
economic development, social, and environmental needs
and goals.
4. Build a framework for coordinated decision-making
between state and federal management agencies.37
It is quite fitting that the Ocean State has such a
comprehensive CMP. Nevertheless, even the front runner has room
to improve as the problem with shellfish restoration discussed
below illustrates.
II. RESTORATION AQUACULTURE: AN EBM METHOD

“We forget that the water cycle and the life cycle are one.”
– Jacques Cousteau
This Comment focuses on the framework applicable to a
hypothetical coastal shellfish habitat restoration project to bolster
ecosystem health that incorporates aquaculture for public benefit
within the State of Rhode Island.38 A secondary and indirect
objective of this project and other projects of this kind is often to
increase species abundance to potentially improve the fishery. This
hypothetical project involves the laying of oyster shell along the
ocean bottom to increase substrate for other species to colonize. The
laying of shell, while minimally invasive, is considered “fill” and
qualifies as aquaculture for permitting purposes.39
37. R.I. ADMIN. CODE 16-1-17:130.4(a)–(d) (West, Westlaw through Feb.
2017 amendments).
38. Though this Comment limits itself to the confines of Rhode Island, this
is a problem shared by all of the coastal states, and none of the coastal states
forbid such projects by its laws.
39.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (Westlaw
through Pub. L. No. 114-327). A “dredge and fill” permit is required from the
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A. The Benefits of Shellfish Restoration
The proposed introduction of oyster into the coast is an EBM
approach to coastal restoration and fisheries management. Such
projects are becoming increasingly common in the United States,
catalyzed by the public’s increased awareness of oyster’s important
ecological role in coastal waters as well as by the fact that they are
relatively budget-friendly compared to alternatives. The American
Oyster (Oyster), Crassostrea virginica, is a keystone species with
an unparalleled ability to restore ecosystem integrity.40 Oysters
are nicknamed “ecosystem engineers” because of the multiple roles
they play, including inter alia: (1) improving water clarity by
filtering large volumes of water per day; (2) improving water
quality by removing nitrogen; (3) increasing the three-dimensional
complexity of the ocean bottom, thereby serving as a habitat for
other species; and (4) protecting shorelines from erosion.41
Shellfish restoration is a powerful way to restore the integrity
and resilience of ecosystems.42 Given the variety of species
associated with three-dimensional structures formed from the
vertical filling of oyster cultch, as well as the complex interactions
that occur between the species, the NOAA, National Fish and

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for most dredging aquaculture activities within
the coastal zone. Id. Aquaculture is defined as “the breeding, rearing, and
harvesting of fish, shellfish, plants, algae and other organisms in all types of
water
environments.”
What
is
aquaculture?,
NOAA,
http://
oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/aquaculture.html (last updated Mar. 28, 2016).
40.
See COMM. ON NONNATIVE OYSTERS IN THE CHESAPEAKE BAY, NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., NONNATIVE OYSTERS IN THE
CHESAPEAKE BAY 323 (2004); see also Juliana M. Harding, Observations on the
Early Life History and Growth Rates of Juvenile Channel Whelks Busycotypus
canaliculatus (Linnaeus, 1758), 30 J. OF SHELLFISH RES. 901, 901–03 (2011)
(suggesting that oyster reefs may provide a higher diversity and availability of
food or a greater amount of higher quality food compared to other marine
habitats); Jonathan H. Grabowski & Charles H. Peterson, Restoring Oyster
Reefs to Recover Ecosystem Services, in ECOSYSTEM ENGINEERS: PLANTS TO
PROTISTS 281–83 (2007).
41.
DOROTHY LEONARD & SANDRA MACFARLANE, BEST MANAGEMENT
PRACTICES FOR SHELLFISH RESTORATION: PREPARED FOR THE ISSC SHELLFISH
RESTORATION COMMITTEE 4 (2011), http://www.ecsga.org/Pages/Sustainability/
ShellfishRestorationBMPs.pdf (presented at the joint meeting of the Northeast
Aquaculture Conference on Shellfish Restoration).
42.
See e.g., Jamie Coelho, How Roger Williams is Saving Our Wild
Oysters, RHODE ISLAND MONTHLY, http://www.rimonthly.com/Rhode-IslandMonthly/December-2015/How-Roger-Williams-is-Saving-Our-Wild-Oysters/
(last visited Mar. 20, 2017).

490 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:482
Wildlife Foundation, and the Environmental Protection Agency
recognize shellfish habitats as priority habitats; these habitats are
considered an “essential fish habitat.”43 Studies show that merely
laying a couple of inches of oyster shells along the ocean bottom has
drastic benefits for ecosystem health because the vertical lift
differential allows species to form habitats higher up in the water
column where dissolved oxygen levels are more concentrated and
conducive to life.44 The ecological services the oyster provides have
been estimated to provide an economic value between $5,500 and
$99,000 per hectare per year.45 The more oysters there are in an
ecosystem, the healthier the water is. The healthier the water, the
healthier the oyster. The healthier the oyster, the healthier its
population and dependent species become.
1.

The Problem with Shellfish Restoration: Restoration in
Closed-to-Harvest Waters

The physical introduction of oysters poses a unique problem for
coastal restoration proponents and, consequently, restoration is
rarely undertaken in the waters that need it most. The best
restoration sites for a project of this kind are most often locations
where oysters once flourished—old commercial harvest sites that
are now too polluted to rear food for human consumption.46 These
waters are the most degraded, and they are not certified for
commercial harvest.47 Of the 33,000 square miles of shellfish
43.
See id. Oyster reefs have been considered an “essential fish habitat”
for resident and transient species. However, because transient generalist
species solely rely on oysters for habitat, it is not considered an “essential fish
habitat” or a “critical habitat” warranting MSA and/or ESA protections. See
16 U.S.C.A. § 1533(a)(3) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327). A “critical
habitat” is an area “essential to the conservation of the species.” Id. §
1532(5)(A)(i) (Westlaw); but see id. § 1802(10) (Westlaw) (An “essential fish
habitat” is defined as “those waters and substrate necessary to fish for
spawning, breeding, feeding or growth to maturity.”).
44.
See ROBERT D. BRUMBAUGH ET AL., THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, A
PRACTITIONERS GUIDE TO THE DESIGN & MONITORING OF SHELLFISH
RESTORATION PROJECTS 7, 8 (2006).
45.
See Jonathan H. Grabowski et al., Economic Valuation of Ecosystem
Services Provided by Oyster Reefs, 62 BIOSCIENCE 900, 900 (2012),
http://www.northeastern.edu/grabowskilab/wpcontent/uploads/2012/04/Grabo
wski-et-al-2012-BioScience_oyster-valuation.pdf.
46. See LEONARD & MACFARLANE, supra note 41, at 4; see also Coelho,
supra note 42 (discussing the effects of the “attractive nuisance” created by
restoration projects in these areas).
47.
LEONARD & MACFARLANE, supra note 41, at 8.
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growing water within the United States, just over 10,000 square
miles are restricted.48 The volume of water being classified and
having harvest restrictions has increased through the years.49 The
primary objection to shellfish habitat restoration is the fear that
their physical reintroduction, given their commercial and
recreational value, will create an “attractive nuisance”50 for
bootleggers to harvest in uncertified waters.51 Contaminated
shellfish on the market would pose both health and economic
risks.52 While there are methods to reduce the risk, they come with
a heavy price that most proponents are ill-equipped to bear and
thus reluctance remains to conduct restoration projects in these
locations.53 Moreover, state law and local regulations do little to
deter bootlegging. An individual who harvests shellfish in these
locations may be guilty of a misdemeanor.54 But to many, a
misdemeanor or a fine is one cost of doing business.55 A bootlegger’s
48. See CHARLES ALEXANDER, NOAA, CLASSIFIED SHELLFISH GROWING
WATERS (1998), http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/websites/retiredsites/sotc_pdf
/SGW.PDF.
49.
See LEONARD & MACFARLANE, supra note 41, at 8 (citing an Office of
Ocean Resources Conservation and Assessment done by the ISSC in 2006).
The Assessment found that in 2005, just under 10 million acres had harvest
limitations in some capacity as compared to about 7 million acres in 1995. Id.
50.
The “attractive nuisance” that proponents are referring to is a legal
tort law doctrine in which a landowner may be held liable for injuries to
children who trespass on land if the injury resulted from a hazardous object or
condition on the land that is likely to attract children who are unable to
appreciate the risk posed by the object or condition. Though this age-old
principle refers to children, the nuisance presented here attracts adults who
are well seasoned on the threats of stealing these oysters. See Maryland
Officials just don’t get it: taking away the license of waterman who poached is
silly—he doesn’t need a license!, THE CHESAPEAKE TODAY (July 1, 2014),
http://www.the-chesapeake.com/2014/07/01/maryland-officials-just-dont-gettaking-away-license-waterman-poached-silly-doesnt-need-license/
[hereinafter Maryland Officials just don’t get it] (discussing a recent case
decision and why the determination is moot). This being said, because
attractive nuisances have historically been viewed as a land based issue and
addressed by land use principles, I too focus my solution on the predominant
land based coastal regime, the CZMA.
51.
LEONARD & MACFARLANE, supra note 41, at 4; Coelho, supra note 42.
52.
LEONARD & MACFARLANE, supra note 41, at 4.
53.
Id.
54.
20 R.I. GEN LAWS § 20-1-16 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Legis.
Sess.).
55.
See Maryland Officials just don’t get it, supra note 50; Cynthia J.
Bashore et al., Analysis of Marine Police Citations and Judicial Decisions for
Illegal Harvesting of Eastern Oysters (Crassostrea Virginica, Gmelin 1791) in
the Maryland Portion of the Chesapeake Bay, United States, from 1959 to 2010,
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self-help decision to break the law outweighs the risk of being
caught.56 Ironically, many bootleggers who are robbing the coastal
projects are also shell fishermen who would personally reap the
economic benefits of successful habitat restoration.57 But the
consequences of bootlegging ripple beyond the edges of the coastal
zone.58 Any potential coastal habitat restoration project must
address this impediment that results from bootlegging, as neither
the National Shellfish Sanitation Program (NSSP), the CZMA, nor
state law provides the answer.59
Many proponents feel that efforts may be better placed in
upgrading the healthier areas than working in the prohibited
areas.60 As a consequence, habitat restoration efforts are largely
conducted in water already healthy enough to rear our food, but not
in the waters that need it most.61 If the objective of almost all
restoration projects is to “clean up” the quality of water in some
respect, then restoration should be conducted in water that is too
31 J. OF SHELLFISH RES. 591, 596 (2012) (finding that there is a positive
correlation between years of low oyster harvests and citations for illegal
harvests and citing a 2008 study where 43% of bootleggers held a valid fishing
license).
56. See Bashore et al., supra note 55, at 596 (describing the various
motivations for illegal harvesting and the state of Maryland’s attempts to
correct the economic imbalance between the cost of getting caught and the
potential economic benefit of harvesting the resource). Moreover, ensuring
environmental enforcement is complex. Decisions whether to break the law in
the context of criminal enforcement largely turn on a calculus of four factors:
(1) the benefit of noncompliance weighed against the chance of apprehension;
(2) the likelihood of conviction; (3) the judicial and administrative processes
that convert observed noncompliance into a legal judgement against the
offender; and (4) the sanctions that are significant enough to achieve the rules
objective. See Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76
J. OF POL. ECON. 169 (1968). Though there is little documentation on
bootlegging in Rhode Island, this is likely because proponents, too, see that the
benefit of breaking the law largely outweighs the other factors. This is
illustrated in other locations, such as the Chesapeake Bay where restoration
aquaculture is more common.
57.
The NSSP despite being a voluntary nationwide program depends
upon and directly involves the cooperation between shellfish shipping states,
the FDA, and the shellfish industry to ensure that shellfish in interstate
commerce are safe for public consumption.
58.
See Joyce R. Lombardi, Modern Oyster Wars: Off the Water and into
Court, 47 MD. B.J. 50, 53 (2014) (discussing the negative impact bootlegging
has had on many facets of society, particularly the courts, in the Chesapeake
area).
59.
Maryland Officials just don’t get it, supra note 50.
60.
LEONARD & MACFARLANE, supra note 41, at 36.
61.
Id.
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polluted to rear food for human consumption.62 Drawing attention
to bodies of water compromised to that degree would encourage the
community to identify and clean up sources of pollution. While
restoration in some form is conducted in these more polluted
locations, the placement of these projects is erratic and their
performance inconsistent. Regulators should make every effort to
incentivize action in these locations in order to improve their
classification and to more appropriately value ecosystem services to
better deter and enforce bootlegging.
2.

The Rhode Island Shellfish Industry

What once was a historic hotbed for growing shellfish
supporting the state’s primary fishery in the early 1900s is now no
longer.63 The Rhode Island wild harvest is nearly zero naturally
occurring oysters as they are now considered an “endangered
species.”64 This decline is attributable primarily to the degradation
of habitat, water quality, harvest pressure, and disease.65 Oyster
62.
There are many reasons why restoration should be conducted in these
locations. First, closed-to-harvest locations serve as a de-facto sanctuary. See
id.; Jason Patlis et al., The National Marine Sanctuary System: The Once and
Future Promise of Comprehensive Ocean Governance, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. 10932,
10934 (2014) (citing a study that shows that marine reserves achieve greater
population density and species diversity in as little as one year). The limited
harvest in its very nature reduces fishing pressure, which allows for shellfish
populations to increase. This, however, is conditioned on the sustained health
of oyster habitat—necessary for juvenile shellfish to accumulate and grow. It
is impractical to assume that proponents would be successful in attaining
sanctuary designations for these locations. See Jason Patlis et al., The
National Marine Sanctuary System: The Once and Future Promise of
Comprehensive Ocean Governance, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. 10932, 10936–39 (2014).
The process is lengthy and involves extensive stakeholder involvement. See id.
No sanctuaries have been designated since 2000. Id. at 10939.
63.
See SARAH SHUMAN, RHODE ISLAND SHELLFISH HERITAGE: AN
ECOLOGICAL HISTORY, 12 (2015), http://shellfishheritage.seagrant.gso.uri.edu
/RI_Shellfish_Heritage_complete. The oyster was once at home in Rhode
Island, as Rhode Island’s hardy and rocky bottom shoreline provided the
species ideal conditions for its proliferation. Id. In the early 1990s the oyster
industry produced 1.3 million bushels of oyster a year. Id. But with the onset
of pollution and the Hurricane of 1938, the fate of the oyster’s natural
population was seemingly sealed. Id.
64.
COASTAL RES. CTR., RHODE ISLAND SHELLFISH MANAGEMENT PLAN 156
(2014); Coelho, supra note 42.
65.
JOSEPH T. DEALTERIS ET AL., NARRAGANSETT BAY SUMMIT 2000, WHITE
PAPER: FISHERIES OF RHODE ISLAND 8, 39 (2000), http://nbep.org/
publications/other/water-quality2009/NBEP%20Bay%20Summit%20%20
fisheries.pdf.
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restoration efforts have only been conducted in spawner
sanctuaries and coastal ponds.66 The restoration project that
served as the one exception to the stipulation against restoration in
closed waters, the Roger Williams University Oyster Gardening for
Restoration and Enhancement (RWU-OGRE) program—“piggybacked” its permitting off a previously authorized emergency
restoration activity.67 And though the cost-to-ecosystem benefit
analysis of the RWU-OGRE restoration project has been critiqued,
even the critics support the continuation of such projects and
recognize the potential the state has to maximize ecosystem
services through further research and implementation.68 And
fifteen years of research leads Rhode Island’s leading scientists to
believe that “self-sustaining populations may never be realized
within the current framework of oyster restoration within Rhode
Island.”69 A change is needed in coastal and fisheries management
to encourage continued restoration efforts; there currently is no
organized planning to evaluate and oversee shellfish restoration70
It is important to note, however, that the RWU-OGRE program
is distinguishable from the hypothetical discussed in this Comment
for a variety of reasons. RWU-OGRE involved the relay and
depuration of oysters to increase oyster spawning stock biomass.71
The RWU-OGRE program was primarily conducted in approved
waters—with oysters being relayed from only a few privately leased
plots in closed-to-harvest or unassessed waters to approved waters
to depuriate before they reach a harvestable size.72 The project also
66.
COASTAL RES. CTR., supra note 64, at 156.
67.
COASTAL RES. CTR., supra note 64, at 219 (noting that restoration
projects implemented as a result of an oil spill in Block Island Sound in 1966
have been adopted and continued by other restoration efforts). These projects
have since been discontinued due to funding restraints. Interview with Dale
Leavitt, Assoc. Professor of Biology, Roger Williams University, in Bristol, R.I.
(Aug. 2016).
68.
Matthew Griffin, Fifteen Years of Rhode Island Oyster Restoration: A
Performance Evaluation and Cost-Benefit Analysis 44 (2016) (unpublished
thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science in Ecology and Ecosystem Science) (on file with the
University of Rhode Island), http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1550&context=oa_diss.
69.
Id. at 45.
70.
COASTAL RES. CTR., supra note 64, at 129.
71.
Id. at 2.
72.
Id. at 222; see also Griffin, supra note 68, at 44.
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involved a mix of techniques and variables that are beyond the
scope of this Comment. Though distinct, the grievances associated
with the “attractive nuisance” aspect of the state approach to
restoration is shared. Matthew Griffin, an RWU-OGRE participant
who recently wrote his dissertation on oyster restoration within
Rhode Island, notes that while “admirable,” the attractive nuisance
aspect of the state approach has the practical effect of blocking the
implementation of restoration in locations with more appropriate
conditions than those not conducted in the closed-to-harvest
waters.73
B. Responsible Agencies
Rhode Island’s CRMC and the Department of Environmental
Management (DEM) are the agencies that oversee shellfish-habitat
restoration.74 The CRMC is the lead agency for coastal issues: it
develops and implements Rhode Island’s coastal area and special
area management plans, handles CZMA consistency reviews, and
issues permits and leases for shellfish aquaculture.75 The DEM is
the lead agency for fisheries management and shellfish
73.
Griffin, supra note 68, at 44 (noting that the attractive nuisance
aspect of the approach is preventing restoration in sites with more appropriate
salinity regimes or known and reliable recruitment of oysters).
74.
20 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 20-1-2 (Supp. 2016); § 20-8.1-5 (West, Westlaw
through 2016 Legis. Sess.); § 46-23-1(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Legis.
Sess.). In Alabama, the Department of Conservation and Natural Resources
and the DEM are the lead agencies for the state’s coastal and fisheries
programs. ALA. CODE §§ 9-2-2, 9-7-16 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Legis.
Sess.). In California, the Coastal Commission is the lead agency for the state’s
coastal programs and the Department of Fish and Wildlife life is the lead
agency for fisheries and aquaculture. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30330, 30411
(West, Westlaw current with all 2016 Reg. Sess. laws).
75. 46 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-23-6(1)-(4) (Supp. 2016). While Rhode Island
has a single centralized agency at the state level that administers the entire
coastal program, other states, such as Washington, engage in partnerships
with local and county government to implement their coastal programs. See
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.58.050 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. and
Spec. Sess.). Rhode Island has eight Ocean SAMPs to address the different
regional issues. Special Area Management Plans, R.I. COASTAL RES. MGMT.
COUNCIL, www.crmc.ri.gov/samps.html (last modified Feb. 8, 2017) (stating
that the eight SAMPs are Metro Bay, Greenwich Bay, Aquidneck Island West
Side, Narrow River, Salt Ponds Region, Pawcatuck River, Ocean, and
Shoreline Change (Beach)). The Ocean SAMPs are the same as CMPs. These
plans are “ecosystem-based management strategies” that are allegedly
consistent with the CRMC’s “mandate to preserve and restore ecological
systems.” Id.
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sanitization: it protects, manages, and restores the state wildlife
and fish resources and also identifies polluted shellfish grounds for
NSSP purposes.76 The State of Rhode Island is a member of the
Interstate Shellfish Sanitation Conference (ISSC).77 DEM and the
Department of Health are the agencies responsible for shellfish
sanitation.78 Currently fourteen percent of the growing waters
have harvest limitations.79 While the Rhode Island Shellfish
Management Plan says restoration in closed waters is prohibited,80
no state law expressly provides so,81 and exceptions have been
76. 20 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 20-1-2 (Supp. 2016); see also § 20-8.1-5 (West,
Westlaw through 2016 Legis. Sess.).
77. List of Members, INTERSTATE SHELLFISH SANITATION CONFERENCE,
http://www.issc.org/r (last visited Mar. 30, 2017). The ISSC was formed to
foster and promote shellfish sanitation through the cooperation of federal and
state agencies, the shellfish industry, and various other stakeholders. COASTAL
RES. CTR., supra note 64, at 222. The ISSC sets the regulations for inter alia
harvest-area classifications and the harvesting, processing and sale of oysters.
Id. It adopts uniform procedures that are incorporated into the NSSP in its
Model Ordinance. Id. at 250. The Model Ordinance is mainly concerned with
consumer health and interstate shipment. Id. at 265.
78. 20 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 20-8.1-5 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Legis.
Sess.). In Alabama, the Department of Public Health is responsible for
shellfish sanitation. ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 420-3-18-.03(13)-(14), -.04 to -.05
(2016). Similarly, in California, the Department of Health Services is
responsible for shellfish sanitation. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 112155(i)(j), 112160-80 (West, Westlaw current with all 2016 Reg. Sess. laws).
79. C.E. Alexander, Classified Shellfish Growing Waters, in NATIONAL
OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION (NOAA), STATE OF THE COAST
REPORT (1998), http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/websites/retiredsites/sotc_pdf
/SGW.PDF. In contrast, 100% of Alabama’s growing waters have harvest
limitations, and 96% of California’s growing waters have harvest limitations.
Id.; cf. Jeff Mercer, Principal Biologist, R.I. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt., Following
the Quahog Through Time and Space, Address at the University of Rhode
Island Annual Ronald C. Baird Sea Grant Science Symposium (Nov. 14, 2013)
(suggesting that Closed Areas may contribute as much as half the effective
reproductive potential of the Narragansett Bay).
80. COASTAL RES. CTR., supra note 64, at 222.
81. See id. (explaining that Rhode Island has some statutes in place for
oyster restoration projects, but those statutes are applied inconsistently); see
also 20 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 20-2-44 (Supp. 2016) (requiring the division of fish
and wildlife to develop a sustainable shellfish management plan); § 20-2-45(2)
(authorizing the DEM to solicit federal funding for oyster restoration);
§ 20-3-4 (permitting the DEM, upon recommendation from the CRMC, to
designate certain portions of the shores and fisheries as “shell fish or marine
life project management areas” for purposes of, among other things, “managing
the harvest of marine species”); § 20-9-1 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Legis.
Sess.) (authorizing the director of the DEM to perform “acts that may be
necessary to the conduct and establishment of cooperative wildlife restoration
projects”). Likewise, neither Alabama nor California expressly prohibits
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made.82
C. Property Ownership and the Public Trust Doctrine
The State of Rhode Island claims title to coastal waters and
submerged lands from the mean high water mark (HWM)83 to three
nautical miles offshore;84 its coastal zone includes this state-owned
water and its adjacent land.85 This land is held for the public in
trust under the state constitution, which preserves the public rights
“including but not limited to fishing from the shore, the gathering
of seaweed, leaving the shore to swim in the sea and passage along
the shore . . . .”86 The Rhode Island Special Area Management Plan
restoration in closed waters. MISSISSIPPI-ALABAMA SEA GRANT LEGAL PROGRAM,
INVENTORY OF SHELLFISH RESTORATION PERMITTING AND PROGRAMS IN THE
COASTAL STATES 10, 17 (2014), http://masglp.olemiss. edu/projects/files/tncreport.pdf.
82.
COASTAL RES. CTR., supra note 64, at 222 (“The restoration program
under RWU is the one exception to this stipulation, with some of the sites
located within closed and un-assayed waters.”).
83. The HWM is the average height of all the high tides at a particular
place measured over an 18.6-year period. State v. Ibbison, 448 A.2d 728, 730
(R.I. 1982).
84. 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-1-1(c) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Legis.
Sess.). In Alabama, most tidal waters below the mean high tide line are held
in trust by the state and managed for the public benefit and in compliance with
state law. ALA. CODE §§ 9-12-20, 9-15-55(a) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg.
Sess.). In California, the state owns tidelands, submerged lands, and beds of
navigable waterways below the ordinary HWM of tidal waterways and below
ordinary low water mark of non-tidal waterways. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 670,
830 (West, Westlaw 2016 Reg. Sess.).
85. 46 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-6.1-4(2) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Legis.
Sess.). Alabama’s coastal zone is as convoluted as its geographic boundary.
See ALA. CONST. art. II, § 37 (West, Westlaw through Mar. 2016 amendments);
ALA. CODE § 9-7-10(1) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (defining
Alabama’s coastal zone as the “area [that] extends seaward to the outer limit
of the United States territorial sea and extends inland from the shorelines only
to the extent necessary to control shorelands, the uses of which have a direct
and significant impact on the coastal waters”). In contrast, California’s coastal
zone is defined broadly as the land and water area “extending seaward to the
state’s outer limit of jurisdiction, including all offshore islands, and extending
inland generally 1,000 yards from the mean high tide line of the sea”). CAL.
PUB. RES. CODE § 30103(a) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.).
86. See R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17 (calling for balancing of public access to
fishery resources with protection of natural environment); 20 R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 20-1-1 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Legis. Sess.) (calling for use of
management techniques to “develop[], preserve[], and maintain[] . . . the
beauty and mystery that wild animals bring to our environment”); Riley v.
Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt., 941 A.2d 198, 208 (R.I. 2008) (holding that the public
trust right is a qualified right and is subject to the General Assembly’s duty to
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defines public trust resources as the “tangible physical, biological
matter substance or system, habitat or ecosystems contained on, in
or beneath the tidal waters of the state.”87 Rhode Island’s “free and
common” fishery is limited by its constitutional requirement that
the public waters must be managed in such a manner as to preserve
and protect the natural resources of the environment of the state.88
D. Aquaculture as Applied to Cultch
Generally speaking, Rhode Island believes that it is within the
best interest of the people “to provide for the conservation of water,
plant, and animal resources” through aquaculture.89 The CRMC
and DEM90 are responsible for the necessary permitting.91
Aquaculture has “one-stop” permitting with the lead agency and its
own Aquaculture Coordinator.92 Aquaculture is even recognized as
a form of agriculture for tax purposes. Aquaculture activities must
preserve, regenerate, and conserve resources); see also Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v.
Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 434 (Cal. 1983) (recognizing commerce,
navigation, fisheries, ecological habitat protection, water oriented recreation,
and preservation of land in its natural condition as public trust rights in
California); see also Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. State, 657
A.2d 1038, 1041 (R.I. 1995).
87. R.I. COASTAL RES. MGMT. COUNCIL, RHODE ISLAND OCEAN SPECIAL
AREA MANAGEMENT PLAN ch. 1, p.13 (2010) [hereinafter SPECIAL AREA
MANAGEMENT PLAN].
88. R.I. CONST. ART. 1, § 17 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Legis. Sess.)
(“[I]t shall be the duty of the general assembly to provide for the conservation
of the air, land, water, plant, animal, mineral, and other natural resources of
the state, and to adopt all means necessary and proper by law to protect the
natural environment of the people of the state by providing adequate resource
planning for the control and regulation of the use of the natural resources of
the state and for the preservation, regeneration and restoration of the natural
environment of the state.”) (emphasis added).
89. See 20 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 20-10-1 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Legis.
Sess.); § 20-10-2 (defining aquaculture as “the cultivation, rearing, or
propagation of aquatic plants or animals under either natural or artificial
conditions”).
90. Alabama adopted a shellfish aquaculture easement program in 2014.
But this may have limited application to restoration work. See ALA. ADMIN.
CODE R. 220-4-.17 (2016).
91. 20 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 20-10-3; see also ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 420-3-18-.06
(2016) (providing that bootleggers are subject to a $500 fine and, if the violation
is continuous, he “shall be punished accordingly); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 112240 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.) (providing that a bootlegger
is guilty of a misdemeanor, and subject to a fine between $100 and $500).
92. R.I. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, Aquaculture and You—Frequently
Asked Questions, RI.GOV, http://www.crmc.ri.gov/aquaculture/aquaculture
faq.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2017).
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adhere to the same water quality based closures and prohibitions
as wild harvesters.93 The process of obtaining an aquaculture lease
is essentially a public review process led by the CRMC.
III. ADDRESSING REGULATORY INADEQUACIES

A coastal state could more efficiently manage its coastal zone
by aggressively using its CZMA powers. First, a coastal state must
maximize its substantive breadth by incorporating EBM into its
CMP. EBM provides a better valuation system for ecosystem
services than “current management approaches to fisheries, water
quality, [and] coastal [management] . . . that are basically focused
on a single service or small set of services, not an interlocking set.”94
If a coastal state incorporates EBM, then EBM issues such as
coastal restoration utilizing shellfish to increase ecosystem
services, will be addressed as well. Rhode Island’s CMP is
exemplary in this respect. The Ocean SAMP is very broad and
incorporates EBM,95 allowing it to potentially challenge and direct
activities in its coastal zone through its consistency program. While
there is a looming fear of litigation challenging a state’s expansive
management—if the state covers its bases by having
comprehensive regulations and policies and enveloping them in
public doctrinal language—challenges of this kind should not be an
issue.96 Rhode Island’s CMP could be improved, however, if its
governance structure did more than merely recognize the linkage
between the commercial and recreational fishing industry and
restoration. The Ocean SAMP recognizes that this issue needs
redress but there is no mechanism to hold the CRMC accountable.97
Moreover, Rhode Island’s Ocean SAMP must be cross-sectorial and
must address human activity that may impact coastal and ocean
resources—the Ocean SAMP does not mention anything about
bootlegging and natural resource robbery. Rhode Island must
publicly denounce bootlegging in order to strengthen the
93. COASTAL RES. CTR., supra note 64, at 178.
94. Elliot Norse, Regional Governance and Ecosystem-Based Management
of Ocean and Coastal Resources: Can We Get There From Here?, 16 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 179, 180 (2006).
95. SPECIAL AREA MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 87, at ch.11, p. 6.
96. DAVID C. SLADE, PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK: THE
APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO THE MANAGEMENT OF LANDS,
WATERS AND LIVING RESOURCES OF COASTAL STATES 245–62 (1990).
97.
R.I. ADMIN. CODE 16-1-17:900 (West, Westlaw through Feb. 2017
amendments).
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interaction between the fishery and coastal sectors. It can do this
by including its management in its current programs and
increasing the fines and penalties on the bootleggers because it is
more appropriate they bear the cost of the loss they caused. The
implementation of a state regulation, outside the Ocean SAMP,
requiring EBM considerations for ocean and coastal resources and
recognizing the interdependence between fishery populations,
habitat, and coastal health would greatly improve accountability.98
While Rhode Island zealously embraces aquaculture, the public
trust has a comprehensive CMP and openly embraces activities of
this kind. However, its implementation is extremely limited; the
“one exception” to the state’s attractive nuisance approach, the
RWU OGRE project, was canceled in January 2016, and no other
restoration activity that mirrors the minimally invasive procedures
discussed here has occurred in state waters. Further, no case law
exists on the direct issue. Rhode Island’s constitutional recognition
of such rights is not self-executing—it must be made effective by
legislation.99 A legally binding distinction needs to be carved out
for less-invasive aquaculture procedures that in the short term may
impair the public’s enjoyment of the oyster fishery, but in the long
term has a direct positive impact on the environment and provides
a public benefit.100 A law of this kind, declaring an overriding
public interest, catered to enhancing public resources over private
industry, would encourage these kinds of practices. Such a law
could create an entity or vest the duty in a pre-existing agency to
design and implement an adaptive approach that builds upon
Rhode Island’s current laws to advance activities that affect coastal
ecosystems in order to ensure the coexistence of healthy ecosystems
and human activities. Such a group could also be specifically tasked
with creating routine reports to the governor and legislature that
define needed legislative and executive actions and funding needs.
In addition to appropriate regulations, Rhode Island could create a
separate permitting system for projects of this kind that, instead of

98.
See, e.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 14-0103 (West, Westlaw
through L.2017) (declaring that the policy of the state “shall be to conserve,
maintain and restore coastal ecosystems so that they are healthy, productive
and resilient and able to deliver the resources people want and need”).
99.
See State v. Cozzens, 2 R.I. 561 (1850) (construing Art. I, § 17 of the
Rhode Island Constitution).
100.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113–202 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg.
Sess.).
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having minimal negative impacts on the environment, make
positive improvements. A separate permitting procedure would
expedite the time spent in the permitting process and allow projects
of this kind to better utilize their resources.
Coastal management could be improved by strengthening
governance through required coordination of the fishery and coastal
sectors, increasing public participation, and overseeing resource
expenditures. To address this problem, the state legislature could
enact a law that tasked a single agency, or required coordination
and cooperation between the DEM and CRMC, with the obligation
of preparing a plan for establishing an integrated system for
improving closed-to-harvest protected areas and improving their
management.101 By creating an agency whose purpose is to
encourage cooperation between the fishery and coastal sectors,
management will be centralized, and less energy will be lost trying
to effectuate individual interests when both have a shared stake in
the outcome. As noted earlier, Roger Williams University recently
canceled its RWU-OGRE program for lack of funding.102 The
program relied on the University and private grants for its
continuation—it did not receive state or federal funding.103 Rhode
Island should prioritize programs like the RWU-OGRE program
not just because of its coastal and fishery implications, but because
the community engagement helps to boost support for the cause and
volunteers help draw out resources. To alleviate the problem,
Governor Gina Raimondo could do what Washington’s Governor did
when it created the Puget Sound Partnership—she could issue an
executive order to develop recommendations for permanent
partnerships of this kind—either to save the RWU-OGRE program
or something similar. Rhode Island's leadership need not wait for
another emergency like the 1966 North Cape Oil spill to carve out
a second exception to the attractive nuisance approach given that
the science and legal authority already exists. Though the Ocean
State's coastal and shellfish management plans are exemplary in
many respects, its implementation of restoration that impacts both
sectors lags far behind other leading coastal states. A stronger
movement towards a healthier coast could be catalyzed by state

101.
See, e.g., CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2855 (West, Westlaw through 2017
Reg. Sess.).
102.
Interview with Dale Leavitt, supra note 67.
103. Coelho, supra note 42.
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leadership drawing attention to the issue. Money may be less of an
issue, if the large number of coastal property owners were made
aware of what they are up against and what support they could give
to curb the issue. The amalgamation of laws that exist may deceive
those not trained in law to believe that progress is being made.
Efforts by leaders like Governor Raimondo is essential to correct
the mistaken belief that progress is being made because laws exist
and to close the knowledge gap between coastal and fisheries
management and the rest of society.104
Coastal management could be improved if state policies
included measurable indicators to more effectively attain its well
established goals and objectives. To improve, the Ocean SAMP
could provide specific methods for how to achieve these goals and
detail them within.105 The approach could be improved by creating
measurable indicators that would evolve from the traditional single
species, or specific delineated plot, to an EBM approach.106 The
program should revise its implementation goals in order to account
for its limited resources—oysters and locations closed-to-harvest.
Taking realistic targets of what can be done with this, and taking
into consideration the historic and existing programs’ funding, the
program should create a coastal wide measure that supports all
topic areas, reflecting achievable objectives given the programs
current resource and initiatives. It is my hope then that, instead of
prioritizing activities in waters healthy enough to grow food,
polluted waters will receive help as well.
Multi-species
management would include those species that rely on oysters for
habitat. This species management could also include water quality
indicators or water quality indicators could be a separate measure.
Management may also be improved if the risk of bootlegging is
assessed against the status of local fishery, current water quality
levels, and other local indicators. Rhode Island's wild oyster fishery
104.
See What is Action Agenda?, PUGET SOUND PARTNERSHIP,
http://www.psp.wa.gov/action-agenda-what.php (last visited Mar. 24, 2017).
105.
See, e.g., CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, CHESAPEAKE BAY HEALTH &
RESTORATION ASSESSMENT: A REPORT TO THE CITIZENS OF THE BAY REGION
(2007),
http://www.chesapeakebay.net/content/publications/cbp_26038.pdf
(The program’s goal was to “develop, promote, and achieve sound land use
practices which protect and restore watershed resources and water quality . . .
and restore and preserve aquatic resources.”).
106. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM OFFICE:
STRENGTHENING THE MANAGEMENT, COORDINATION, AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF
THE CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM ii–iii (2008).
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is nearly dead and thus its justification for applying the attractive
nuisance approach is weaker than those coastal states with
thriving wild fisheries and heavy involvement in interstate
commerce.
Substantively, Rhode Island’s Ocean SAMP is limited because
it does not address all living marine resources based on
maintaining the health of the ecosystem. While the Ocean SAMP
recognizes and promotes EBM, it needs to go a step further by
explicitly recognizing significant species vital to a sustainable
coast. This would require the CRMC to designate species as being
exploitable or protected. As applied to the issue presented in this
Comment, the oyster should be acknowledged and should receive
heightened protection. By explicitly acknowledging the importance
of the oyster and the ecosystem services it provides, the CRMC
would better position itself to combat the bootlegging faux pas.
IV. CONCLUSION

Coastal states are at a crossroads between competing uses of
the coastal zone. States need to take full advantage of their CZMA
authority to more efficiently restore their coastal zones. A coastal
state would first accomplish this by incorporating EBM into its
approach and by making its CMP as comprehensive as possible.
Second, a coastal state should enact state regulations that
recognize and reinforce EBM as well as incentives and practices
that pursue its coastal zone’s most polluted waters. Once EBM is
embedded in its laws, a coastal state may more effectively enforce
its policies through an aggressive implementation of its CZMA
authority. While the use of the state’s powers in such style may
cause some short-term economic and political disruption, the
feasible results that likely will be achieved outweigh such negative
results in the long run. But as fisheries continue to be exploited, as
the oyster in Rhode Island illustrates, and coastal areas remain
degraded and largely untouched, there does not seem to be a choice.
Armed with the CZMA authority and state regulations that
add some teeth, coastal states have the scientific, congressional,
and stakeholder support to implement a new coastal restoration
policy that will change the way in which activities are conducted in
the coastal zone. Rhode Island is in the best position to continue to
lead the coastal states in efficiently managing its coastal zone
through the aggressive implementation of its CZMA authority
because of its limited size and because it already incorporates EBM
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in its Ocean SAMP. While the proposals made in this Comment are
not particularly novel, successful implementation of them would be.
The exercise of state powers in this manner should overcome a court
challenge because such actions are the product of states acting
pursuant to their duty as a trustee to ensure the sustainability of
their coastal resources.
To summarize, Rhode Island and other coastal states have
little to lose and much to gain by aggressively implementing their
CZMA authority. As the threat climate change poses becomes more
of a reality, I urge Rhode Island to consider implementing the
proposals made in this Comment as soon as possible. The longer
we wait the less we can revive, and the more it will cost at a later
date.

